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Introduction
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Grassley, members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to appear before you again to share my views on the important issue of continued
oversight of U.S. Government surveillance activities, including activities conducted under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
I am currently the Director of National Security Studies and an Adjunct Professor of Law
at Georgetown University Law Center, where, among other things, I teach a course on
Intelligence Reform. The views presented in this statement and at this hearing are my own, and
should not be construed to reflect the views of any employer, current or former. This statement
was reviewed by the government for classification purposes.
By way of background, prior to joining Georgetown Law in November 2011, I spent my
career as a practicing national security lawyer in the Executive Branch. In 2009, I served as
Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the United States Department
of Justice, where I co-chaired an interagency group created by the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) to improve FISA processes. From 2007-2009, I served in a joint duty capacity
as a Senior Associate General Counsel at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
where I worked behind the scenes on matters relating to the legislative efforts that resulted in the
FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Once that law was passed, I was involved in many aspects of
implementing the FISA Amendments Act, as well as standing up the internal executive branch
interagency oversight structure. Prior to my tour at ODNI, I served for several years as an
attorney in the office now called the Office of Intelligence, which is part of the National Security
Division at the Department of Justice, and appeared frequently before the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC). I handled both counterterrorism and counterintelligence national
security investigations. Later, I became involved in policy matters, including contributing to the
development of the Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI Domestic Operations and updated
FISA minimization procedures. I also did a short stint as a Special Assistant United States
Attorney in the Northern District of Texas. Early in my career, I spent considerable time
preparing information that was reported to both the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees of
Congress as part of the annual public reports on FISA as well as the comprehensive semi-annual
reports on FISA. In short, I am one of a very small handful of attorneys currently outside of
government who has direct experience with the operational, legislative, policy, and oversight
aspects of FISA, as it was practiced from 2000-2010.
Accordingly, my views are informed by this up-front perspective regarding how the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and later
the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, vastly improved the Intelligence Community’s ability to
protect the nation from another attack on the scale of September 11th. More recently, I have had
the added benefit of having spent the past three years outside of government to reflect, and to
engage with the academic community, and to some extent the public, regarding some of the
issues this Committee is considering today.
Since the Committee’s October 2, 2013 hearing, the legislative debate and public
conversation have been influenced by additional events. First, new legislation has been
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introduced, in particular, S.1599, the USA FREEDOM Act, a bipartisan bill sponsored by the
Chairman; as well as S.1631, the FISA Improvements Act of 2013, the bill put forth by
Chairman Feinstein of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, who, of course, also serves
on this Committee. That bill has been voted out of Committee. Second, the Executive Branch
has declassified additional documents that are relevant to the current legislative debate, including
but not limited to a FISC opinion on the ongoing telephony metadata program,1 as well as a FISC
opinion regarding the collection of Internet metadata that has since been discontinued.2 Third,
additional unauthorized disclosures of classified information have continued on what seems like
at least a weekly basis. A recent example is the December 4, 2013 Washington Post story on
NSA’s collection of international cell site data.3
As a result of these and other developments, the conversation has shifted somewhat from
where it was in October. I would like to offer a few observations that pick up on these
developments. First, I would suggest that the conversation has evolved from objections to
specific programs, such as the 215 or 702 collections (although objections do remain,
particularly on 215), to a discussion of our cultural understanding and acceptance of foreign
intelligence surveillance activities more broadly. Consideration of providing privacy protections
to foreigners in the surveillance context, as well as whether to prohibit altogether the use of FISA
for so-called “bulk” collection, have become a larger part of the debate. Second, legislative
proposals, including S.1599, are coming closer to scaling back national security legal authorities
in a way that would take the country backwards by reinstituting legal standards above and
beyond what is required in the criminal investigative context. And, third, the path forward on
authorized public disclosure in a way that both protects classified information and restores
relationships between the private sector and consumers, as well as between the private sector and
the U.S. Government, remains a worthy goal, but a significant challenge.
I. Proposals to Scale Back Foreign Intelligence Collection
A. Metadata Collection
Increasingly, the argument against the telephony metadata4 collection under the business
records provision of FISA, as amended by section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, focuses on
1

Memorandum Opinion, In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the
Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], BR 13-158, dated October 11, 2013 (available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-158-memo-131018.pdf).
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[Redacted], PR/TT [Redacted], Opinion and Order, dated [Redacted], (available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf).
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Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations Worldwide, Snowden Documents Show,
December 4, 2013 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locationsworldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_story.html).
4
Footnote 1 in Judge Mary McLaughlin’s October 11, 2013 primary order defines “telephony metadata” as:
“…comprehensive communications routing information, including but not limited to session identifying
information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity
(IMSI) number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc…), trunk identifier,
telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call. Telephony metadata does not include the
substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. 2510(8), or the name, address, or
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what I will call the “power of metadata” argument. 5 The argument goes something like this:
metadata, that is, the information about our communications (such as dialed digits made in a
phone call), can be assembled and analyzed in a way that it previously could not, both due to the
way that data is communicated, retained and collected, as well as through tools that are now
available to analyze it. Therefore, the argument goes, if the government collects large volumes
of Americans’ metadata, and then assembles, maps and/or analyzes that information, the
government could learn an awful lot about a person, or a group of persons, simply by looking at
metadata. Accordingly, metadata is a very powerful tool and there should be limits on the
government’s collection and use of it.
I doubt most Americans would argue with this proposition. I certainly don’t. The problem
with this argument made in the context of the debate concerning the current NSA surveillance
activities under FISA, and the 215 program in particular, is that the worrisome assemblage of
Americans’ metadata bears no relation to the existing 215 program under consideration by
Congress. According to the information that has been publicly disclosed by the Government, the
telephony metadata program under section 215 does collect an enormous volume of Americans’
telephone call detail records. 6 The collected information does not appear to include the content
of phone calls, names of subscribers, payment information, or location information. The vast
majority of the information collected is never viewed by human eyes. It simply sits in a so-called
electronic or digital “black box,” held by the NSA, and eventually ages off the system. The
records are collected under FISA Court order that requires that the data acquired under this
program: (i) only be used for counterterrorism purposes; (ii) only be queried by trained,
designated personnel and that the queries themselves are approved by a smaller number of
designated supervisory personnel; (iii) only be queried according to standards set out in the
order; (iv) be destroyed within five years of collection; and (v) be subject to additional handling
and processing procedures as directed by the FISC in its order.7 The Court has said, in a written
opinion, that without all of the limits in place, the Court would not have approved the program.8
Moreover, current Supreme Court precedent holds that there is no expectation of privacy
in our telephone metadata, that is, the numbers we dial or the numbers that dial us. A warrant is
not required to obtain this information.9 Likewise, Supreme Court precedent also still holds that
financial information of a subscriber or customer. Furthermore, this Order does not authorize the
production of cell site location information (CSLI).” (opinion and order available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-158-memo-131018.pdf).
5
I previously described this and a second issue discussed in this statement in a post on Lawfare on November 14,
2013 (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/11/thoughts-on-two-propositions-the-power-of-metadata-andproviding-privacy-protections-to-foreigners/).
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Amended Memorandum Opinion, In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring
the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], BR 13-109, dated August 29, 2013, at p.4 (available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-09-primary-order.pdf).
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Memorandum Opinion, In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the
Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], BR 13-158, dated October 11, 2013 (available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-158-memo-131018.pdf).
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Amended Memorandum Opinion, In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring
the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], BR 13-109, dated August 29, 2013, at p.3 (available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-09-primary-order.pdf).
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Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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we do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records voluntarily turned over to a third
party.10 In the first publicly-released FISC opinion on the 215 program dated August 29, 2013,
Judge Claire Eagan, approving continuation of the business records metadata program, offered a
straightforward analysis of the law:
In conducting its review of the government’s application, the Court considered whether
the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution imposed any impediment to the
government’s proposed collection. Having found none in accord with U.S. Supreme
Court precedent, the Court turned to Section 215 to determine if the proposed collection
was lawful and that Orders requested from this Court should issue. The Court found that
under the terms of Section 215 and under operation of the canons of statutory
construction such Orders were lawful and required, and the requested Orders were
therefore issued.11
Since this Committee’s October 2, 2013 hearing, the Government has released a new
written opinion, by Judge Mary McLaughlin, who had not previously ruled on the 215 program.
Judge McLaughlin approved the continuation of the program, and adopted Judge Eagan’s
previous analysis. In addition, she distinguished United States v. Jones,12 the 2012 case
concerning GPS surveillance, stating that “Jones involved the acquisition of a different type of
information through different means.”13 She went on to state:
The Supreme Court may some day revisit the third-party disclosure principle in the
context of twenty-first century communications technology, but that day has not arrived.
Accordingly, Smith remains controlling with respect to the acquisition by the government
from service providers of non-content telephony metadata such as the information to be
produced in this matter.14
In the meantime, current collection activities, based on the FISC opinions and accompanying
materials that have been declassified by the government, are consistent with current precedent
and existing interpretations of the laws.
As I noted in my previous statement, with respect to 215 in particular and intelligence
programs generally, I believe that they should be regularly reviewed and evaluated to determine
whether they continue to be necessary and valuable. It is wholly appropriate to end a collection
program that has outlived its usefulness, or perhaps is no longer necessary based on new
10

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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technologies or methods of collecting intelligence that may be more efficient or productive. As
we now know publicly from the release of the opinion regarding the now-defunct Internet
metadata program, intelligence programs come and go. And so it may be useful for Congress to
look beyond the immediate focus on 215, and think more broadly regarding what limits it may or
may not want to place on the Intelligence Community in light of as-yet-unforeseen threats or
needs.
Some will argue that Congress should outlaw bulk collection under FISA, based on the
“power of metadata” argument as well as arguments about our changing expectation of privacy
in light of the methods of modern communications. But everyday Americans, or friends in
foreign nations, are not the only people using the Internet to communicate. We all - - regular
people, government leaders, as well as those who pose national security threats such as terrorists,
terrorist financiers and facilitators, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, spies,
sophisticated hackers, and cyber intruders - - use the Internet, computers, and smart phones to
communicate. And so just as regular people should not be expected to turn off their modern
communications and revert to old fashioned modes of communication, neither should the
Intelligence Community or law enforcement resort to pen, paper and index cards to conduct
national security collection or investigations. It is just as unrealistic to expect citizens to unplug,
as it is to expect or require the NSA or FBI to use 20th century collection, analytic or
investigative techniques or methods to protect the nation from 21st century threats.
B. Providing Privacy Protections to Foreigners
In light of recent unauthorized disclosures, concerns have also been expressed regarding
the NSA’s collection targeting or pertaining to foreign persons located outside the United States.
Suggestions have been made that U.S. foreign intelligence collection should recognize some sort
of privacy right for non-U.S. persons.
In fact, the U.S. Intelligence Community has a recent history of affording Constitutional
protections to persons who are not entitled to them. Congress made a deliberate decision with the
passage of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to end that practice. And for good reason: prior to
2007, the U.S. government was, in fact, going through incredible hoops to acquire certain
communications of foreign terrorist targets overseas. Two parallel processes caused this to
happen. The first was described in a written statement for the record by the Director of National
Intelligence before this Committee in September 200715
“…[P]rior to Congress passing the Protect America Act last month, in a significant
number of cases, IC agencies were required to make a showing of probable cause in order
to target for surveillance the communications of a foreign intelligence target located
overseas. Then, they needed to explain that probable cause finding in documentation, and
obtain approval of the FISA Court to collect against a foreign terrorist located in a
15

Statement for the Record of J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, September 25, 2007 (available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/
20070925_testimony.pdf).
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foreign country. Frequently, although not always, that person's communications were
with another foreign person located overseas. In such cases, prior to the Protect America
Act, FISA’s requirement to obtain a court order, based on a showing of probable cause,
slowed, and in some cases prevented altogether, the Government's ability to collect
foreign intelligence information, without serving any substantial privacy or civil liberties
interests.”
In other words, the Intelligence Community, because of the requirements of the FISA statute
prior to 2007, found itself in a position where it was seeking individual probable cause-based
orders from the FISC to target terrorists overseas. When the government needed to obtain certain
communications of a terrorist target, located in, as examples, Pakistan or Yemen, it was
preparing a full application to the FISC, with a detailed factual showing providing probable
cause that the target was an agent of a foreign power, and obtaining the signatures of a high
ranking national security official and the Attorney General, and then submitting that application
to the FISC for approval. This extensive process, in addition to being unnecessary from a
Constitutional perspective, was a crushing force on the system.
In a separate but somewhat related chain of events and as described in the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence’s Report of October 26, 2007,16 in January 2007, the Attorney
General announced that collection that had previously been conducted under the Terrorist
Surveillance Program had transitioned to collection authorized by the FISC. The FISC’s
authorization was based on findings that “’there is probable cause to believe that one of the
communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist group.’”17 According
to the SSCI report, Congress subsequently received the Administration’s proposal to modernize
FISA in April 2007. The report went on to state:
“The Administration’s proposal for FISA modernization was comprehensive, and had
been coordinated within the Department of Justice and the intelligence community. At
the end of May 2007, however, attention was drawn to the FISA Court. When a second
judge of the FISA Court considered renewal of the January 2007 FISA orders, he issued a
ruling that the DNI later described as significantly diverting NSA analysts from their
counterterrorism mission to provide information from the Court. In late July, the DNI
informed Congress that the decision of the second FISA Court judge had led to the
degraded capabilities in the face of a heightened terrorist threat environment. The DNI
urged the Congress to act prior to the August recess to eliminate the requirement of a
court order to collect foreign intelligence about foreign targets located overseas.”18
[emphasis added]
As this Committee is aware, in August 2007, Congress enacted the Protect America Act of 2007,
the interim law. Next came the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, including the significant section
702, which enabled collection against non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the
16

Report 110-209, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,
Amendments Act of 2007, (http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/071025/report.pdf).
17
Id. at p.5.
18
Id. at p. 5-6.
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United States to proceed, not under probable cause requirements, but under a Director of
National Intelligence and Attorney General approved certification, and under targeting and
minimization procedures approved by the FISC. Future considerations of affording
Constitutional protections to foreigners outside the United States should take the experiences of
this recent history into account.
II. Analysis of Selected Sections of S.1599
I would next like to highlight four components of S.1599. The first three would, in my
view, significantly limit the effectiveness of the U.S. Government to conduct foreign intelligence
activities to protect the nation from the national security threats of today, and, tomorrow. The
fourth is a brief comment on competing proposals to add an adversarial component to the FISA
process.
First, sections 101 and 201 would change the legal standards to obtain business records
and implement pen register/trap and trace devices by requiring a connection to an agent of a
foreign power. The sections also add a “materiality” requirement in addition to relevance. The
likely intended effect of these provisions is to eliminate the utility of these provisions for large
scale collection, such as the 215 telephony metadata program. But the proposed changes would
likely have far more dramatic, and harmful, consequences to more traditional, day-to-day,
national security investigations. The standards are currently aligned with investigative
authorities in the criminal investigative context, such as subpoenas and pen register/trap and
trace surveillance conducted under Title 18. Both of those criminal authorities operate on a
relevance standard. By raising the standard to requiring a connection to an agent of a foreign
power, these sections would render these investigative techniques nearly useless in the early
stages of an investigation, which is precisely when they are most useful. Investigators may never
get to determine whether a target rises to the agent of a foreign power standard, if they cannot
conduct the less intrusive records request or pen register/trap and trace surveillance as part of an
investigation. These changes, if made law, would return us to the days prior to September 11,
2001, when it was harder for an investigator to request records or conduct pen register/trap and
trace surveillance in an international terrorism case than it was in an everyday drug or fraud case.
Similarly, section 501 would amend the collection of statutory authorities known as
“national security letters” by requiring the requested records to have a connection to an agent of
a foreign power. The effect of this provision, if it became law, cannot be understated: it would
severely limit the FBI’s ability to conduct timely and thorough national security investigations.
The criminal investigative counterpart to a national security letter is a subpoena. Subpoenas are
issued based on relevance to an investigation. By requiring a nexus to an agent of a foreign
power, which is a defined set of terms under FISA, the bill limits the ability of the FBI to request
records at early stages of investigation. Moreover, Attorney General Guidelines require that
national security letters may only be used in the context of a predicated investigation, which
must meet certain factual thresholds and supervisory approvals; national security letters may not
be used in an assessment alone.19 This limiting guideline already imposes a higher bar to

19

Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Domestic Operations (September 29, 2008) (http://www.justice.gov/
ag/readingroom/ guidelines.pdf).
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obtaining a national security letter than a subpoena for telephone or electronic mail subscriber
information, which may be used at the assessment stage.20
Second, section 301 would appear to prohibit the Intelligence Community from querying
data acquired pursuant to section 702 of FISA to search for U.S. person communications. Under
the current minimization procedures approved by the FISC for 702 collection, the NSA may
query communications already acquired under section 702 for U.S. person communications.21
The proposed legislation would only allow the same query to take place if the U.S. person
(presumably about whom the query is made) is the “subject of an order” of current surveillance,
search or acquisition pursuant to FISA or criminal authorities. In other words, the U.S. person
would already have to have been found to be an agent of a foreign power by the FISC, or the
target of a criminal wiretap, both of which would require prior judicial approval based on
probable cause. (The legislation does include emergency and consent exceptions to the proposed
prohibition).
Consider the following hypothetical: this proposal could arguably prohibit the
Intelligence Community from querying already lawfully acquired data to search for the methods
of communication used by, say, Adam Gadahn, or someone like him. As Members of this
Committee are aware, Adam Gadahn is a U.S. citizen who is on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorist
List.22 He is a known al Qaeda propagandist and is the subject of a pending indictment on
charges of providing material support to terrorism, among other charges.23 Most recently,
according to press reports, Gadahn posted an audio speech encouraging militants to attack U.S.
interests.24 Several days later, on December 5, 2013, American teacher Ronald Thomas Smith II
was attacked and killed in Benghazi, Libya.25 Let’s assume for a moment that the U.S.
Intelligence Community does not currently know what telephone numbers or email addresses
Gadahn uses to communicate. (Again, I have no idea whether it does or does not have this
information, or whether Gadahn even uses such modes of communication.) In such a case,
querying existing, lawfully-acquired 702 data for accounts or identifiers used by Gadahn would
be of significant foreign intelligence value. And, the issue is not whether Gadahn could be found
to be an agent of a foreign power; under the legislation as drafted, it only matters whether he is,
currently, the target of existing collection. If the U.S. Intelligence Community does not know
what methods he uses to communicate, then he would not, as a practical matter, be a target of
current collection authority, because there would be no number, account or identifier to collect
against. In short, the proposed section 301 limitation would prevent the U.S. Intelligence
Community of learning exactly the type of information we expect it to discover to protect U.S.
interests and Americans from terrorist activity.
20

Id.
See Exhibit B, Minimization Procedures Used By the National Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of
Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, As
Amended, dated October 31, 2011, at p.6 (http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
Minimization%20Procedures%20used%20by%20NSA%20in%20Connection%20with%20FISA%20SECT%20702.pdf).
22
http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists.
23
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/adam_indictment.pdf.
24
Associated Press, U.S. Teacher Shot Dead in Benghazi, December 5, 2013 (available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303997604579240163015786696).
25
Id.
21
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This is not to suggest that querying NSA databases for U.S. person information is not
sensitive. It is. And it should be done in accordance with meaningful procedures, approvals and
oversight. Indeed, according to the now-declassified minimization procedures governing 702
collection, the “use of United States person identifiers as terms to identify and select
communications must first be approved in accordance with NSA procedures[,]” and are subject
to oversight by the Department of Justice and the Office of the Direct of National Intelligence.26
Accordingly, while I do see the issue of NSA queries using U.S. person identifiers to be a
legitimate issue for this Committee and/or the Intelligence Committee to conduct oversight of, I
would submit that the legislative proposal to prohibit such queries is inappropriately restrictive in
the context of the national security mission.
Third, section 302 would appear to limit the way in which NSA uses its collection
technologies against valid foreign intelligence targets. Unfortunately, in an effort to limit certain
kinds of collection to only those circumstances that would protect against international terrorism
or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, this provision leaves open the possibility that
certain collection techniques would not be available against other valid threats, such as cyberbased threats. For example, a cyber attack directed against U.S. critical infrastructure,
perpetrated by or at the direction of a foreign power, would appear not to fall into the exception.
Understanding that the intent of this provision is likely intended to make certain collection
techniques available only in the most serious of threats, articulating them in the statute itself
would leave the Intelligence Community vulnerable to facing operational situations where the
law again lags behind the threats and sophistication of hostile actors.
Fourth, section 901 of the bill would add an Office of Special Advocate. I would refer the
Committee to my previous statement, in which I discuss why, in my view, a separate office is
both unnecessary given the FISC’s independent oversight of Executive Branch activities, and
would add significant bureaucracy to an already heavily lawyered FISA process. However, given
the increasing Congressional and public interest in providing the FISC with the ability to call on
outside views in considering novel issues, I would submit that the approach offered in S.1631,
which gives the FISC discretion to appoint an amicus curiae for either legal or technical advice
or views, is less objectionable than establishing a permanent Office of the Special Advocate.
III. Proposals to Enhance Transparency
S.1599 contains a number of transparency provisions directed at both surveillance
authorities and national security letters. The legislation approaches the public reporting from two
perspectives: what the companies can release, and what the U.S. government should release. In
my view, there is substantial value in Congress continuing to work with the Executive Branch
and the private sector to rebuild confidence between them, and for the U.S. Government to help
the private sector restore confidence with consumers, customers and investors. In 2008, Congress
acted in this area by including liability protection in the FISA Amendments Act for companies

26
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that had voluntarily assisted the government after September 11, 2001, and whose cooperation
was subsequently exposed by the significant unauthorized disclosure that took place in 2005.
In my previous statement, I suggested that, in the interests of facilitating transparency
while reducing the reactive nature of each authorized public release, Congress could amend the
reporting provisions in FISA to provide additional public information—whether it is statistics,
declassified legal opinions, summaries of implementation actions or reports on compliance
matters—semi-annually, quarterly, or at some other appropriate regular interval. I note that
S.1599 contains several reporting provisions that would occur either annually, or quarterly.
With respect to the content of the proposed public reports, I would suggest that further
consideration and revision is in order, on several fronts. As a guiding principle, I would suggest
that any new public reporting only be mandated by law if Congress is confident that it can
reasonably be produced accurately. Inaccurate or inconsistent reporting will lead to more
questions and less confidence, and may be worse than no reporting at all.
While I would expect that representatives of the Intelligence Community will address
concerns with the legislation about disclosing information about targets of surveillance or other
data points that may be impossible to produce, I would like to highlight several sections that
would benefit from additional consideration:


Section 601 provides that electronic service providers may report on estimates of
demands and requests made and complied with, and estimates of numbers of users or
accounts. It may be that the providers and government prefer estimates versus actual
numbers, but the proposal does raise some concerns that public reporting from different
sources will be inconsistent, which may have the unintended consequence of
undermining confidence, not bolstering it. I would also urge caution on releasing
numbers of users or accounts affected: if targets use multiple accounts, the number may
be misleadingly high.



Section 601 also proposes to define “surveillance law.” Curiously, the section includes
the national security letter statutes, which are not surveillance laws, but appears to
exclude the federal criminal wiretap law.



Section 602 proposes that the government disclose numbers of persons “subject to
electronic surveillance.” If the intent of this proposal is to release how many individuals’
communications were collected—either through targeting or incidentally—then it is
important to consider the reverse effect on privacy protections that this disclosure would
have. Because intelligence analysts only review communications in pursuit of identifying
foreign intelligence information, there is a body of collected information that is either
never reviewed, or, reviewed but not analyzed, reported, or counted for any statistical
purposes. Similarly, minimization procedures would require that analysts not write
reports about U.S. persons who may be incidentally collected but whose communications
do not appear to be foreign intelligence information. Accordingly, a requirement to report
on numbers of persons collected would actually degrade privacy practices: it would
require that Intelligence Community personnel look at, read, review, count, keep records
11

about and report on information that they otherwise would disregard in pursuit of their
actual mission of discovering, analyzing and reporting foreign intelligence information.
Conclusion
I thank the Chairman, Ranking Member and Committee Members for providing me with
this additional opportunity to share my views on the efforts to reform U.S. Government
surveillance activities. Although there is significant public and political pressure to act to reform
surveillance activities, I continue to urge the Committee to move cautiously: changes made
quickly now will have consequences for the nation’s security for years to come. I look forward to
continuing to work with the Members and staff of this Committee on these important issues.
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